SESSION 1: AMERICA’S RELIGIOUS VOTE: MIDTERMS AND NEW TRENDS
INTRODUCTION

MR. GOOD: So I want to say just a brief word about each of these gentlemen before they speak and then away we go. Henry Olsen is a colleague and senior fellow of Ethics and Public Policy Center. He has done a couple of books that focused on the Four Phases of the Republican Party and on Working Class Republican: Ronald Reagan. So pay close attention to populism both in the States and around the world. So I think he’ll bring an interesting perspective and is one of the most watched voices on precincts and on leanings and on inclinations sort of underneath the surface around the country. So we’ll look forward to his remarks. (Inaudible) years ago and Chicago Law School, editor of The Law Review. Alan Cooperman directs the Research Initiative at the Pew Research Center and is an expert on religion in the United States, but also around the world. Pays close attention to the Middle East and Russia and Europe. Just to give you a flavor of a couple recent publications he’s covered Mormon’s in American, Muslim Americans, U.S. Religious Knowledge Survey, “Nones” on the Rise, A Portrait of Jewish Americans, and he’s also a former reporter like a number of you at the Washington Post. So I think we’ll have just the right mix. And on the way over we were talking about whether or not it’s even possible for there to be movement, is this kind of all locked in or not. And the story came to mind of the two Republican Congressmen who were walking down the street in -- on Capitol Hill, you know, kind of set in their ways both in their almost ten years. And they saw a little sign in the Democratic National Convention Headquarters that said, “Become a Democrat today. Earn $1,000.” And they thought to themselves this can’t be -- could this be right? You know, what’s -- so they -- one of them -- you know, they keep talking, keep walking along. One of them decides he’s gonna actually venture in to check this thing out. And so he does and spends a whole hour in there in the office. Doesn’t come out for a whole hour. And finally he emerges and reconnects with his friend. And his buddy says, “So what happened?” And the Congressman says, “You know, they were right. We’ve been wrong all these years on a lot of things. On poverty, on work, on war.” And so the guy says, “Did you switch? Did you” -- he says, “Yeah.” The Republic Congressman says, “Did they give you a thousand bucks?” The guy turns to him and says, “Is that all
you people care about?” So we’ll see whether there’s movement that’s happened recently or not. Brief reminder, #FaithAngle for this conversation and for the day. There are a lot of people around the country who are paying attention to what you have to say, what Henry and Alan have to say. We’re so grateful that you’re here. Henry, welcome to Faith Angle. The floor is yours.

HENRY OLSEN

MR. OLSEN: Well, thank you. I’m going to leave most of the faith aspect of this to Alan who is the expert in that and try and talk about the (inaudible) as part of what we seen in politicians have deeply embedded questions of religion or non-religion and differences of opinion embedded in (inaudible), but I’ll leave Alan to dissect that for you because I wouldn’t have much to add other than what I just said. Instead I will go talk about what I see as the overall arching trend of what mid-term -- happen in the mid-term and what it means to the extent it means anything going forward. At the surface of it this looks like a pretty big Democratic victory. Right now they’re guaranteed picking up 32 House seats, they’re leading or expected to take the lead in a number more so that the final toll -- (A brief cell phone interruption.)

MR. GOOD: Oh, and that’s a reminder not only to be here, but if you wouldn’t mind...

MR. OLSEN: I never get phone calls of course it’s starting right there. You know, so it’ll end up 38 to 40. The biggest Democratic gains in the House since the Watergate victory of 1974. Picked up 7 governorships, almost flipped super red states like Texas and Georgia, hundreds of state legislators with only the slight blemish of losing some incumbent Senators in the Midwest. But now it looks like picking up two in the southwest, Dean Heller of Nevada and almost certainly Kyrsten Sinema in Arizona. So it looks like a pretty good victory for the Democrats. But, in fact, that’s only part of the story. This was a tale of two elections. The election that caused the switches to the Democrats was the election in urban and predominantly suburban America. That regardless of location if you were in a suburb, particularly a high income and high educated suburb for your state you were highly likely as an independent to have changed your vote, moved over to the Democrats. And virtually all of the Democratic House seat gains can be found in places like that. The other part of America, though, is rural and small town America. And in this area we saw a -- not only no flip to the Democrats, but we saw a continuation of the 2016 trend of
many former Democrats who are blue collar continuing to vote for the Republican only this time they did it without Trump on the ballot. That in 2016 Trump received the highest score percentages in county after county after county throughout the Midwest and similar places of any Republican presidential candidate -- in some cases even more than people like Richard Nixon who 61 percent of the vote in those areas -- going back to the Great Depression. And there was a big question, well, if it’s not Trump on the ballot are Trump Democrats going to vote for Republican? And the answer from Tuesday’s results is a heck of a lot of them did and there was enough to deliver certain governorships to the Republican Party and the Senate seats to the Republican Party. So let me go a little bit deeper into that and try and explain why we looked at two elections and why it’s important to note that as we’re talking about going forward to 2020. I wrote a piece for the National Review. Every two years I have the hubris of trying to predict the election and I write a brief 4 or 5,000-word memo giving out my picks and explaining why. And the pick -- this year’s piece was entitled Revenge of the RINOS. For those of you who are conservative Republicans, RINO is the pejorative acronym given to people who are deemed to be insufficiently conservative, Republican in name only. The conservative activists have long thought that RINOS were traitors. That they were predominantly legislators who would abandon their base, ignored the wishes of their constituents, turned by the blandishments of lobbying and the leadership power to become traitors to the cause. And so there have been -- hunting RINOS is a phrase of mirth among conservative activists. That the Club for Growth actually had said they are hunting RINOS on their website. And what we discovered in the election is that RINOS, in fact, are an indigenous species to the American political landscape. They are not traitors. They are millions of people who actually had views different than movement conservatives and previously thought of themselves as Republicans in more than name only, but in the Trump era no longer think of themselves as open to voting for a Trumpist Republican Party. In 2016, about 3 million of these people switched all the way over to voting for Mitt Romney. Another 4 million, 5 million withheld their votes from Donald Trump and either wrote in Mickey Mouse or voted for Ed McMullen or Gary Johnson. And on election day this time virtually all of them stayed -- either stayed loyal to the Democratic Party that they had voted for in 2016 or made the switch all the way over. At the
places where you look at the House seat gained they are almost all in seats that were either carried by Obama and Clinton in 2012 and 2016 or in places that were carried for Mitt Romney and then switched to Clinton or switched so much that there’s only narrowly Trump. And the perfect example both of those type of seats is the west -- or it goes from Houston, John Culberson’s seat is the linear descendant of the seat that was represented by George H. W. Bush and longtime House Ways and Means Committee Chair Bill Archer. It voted for Mitt Romney by 21 points in 2012, voted for Hillary Clinton by 1 point in 2016, and it supported Lizzie Fletcher by 4 points -- was it 4, 5 points? Trump got 47 percent, John Culberson got 47 percent and there the story wrote is George H. W. -- richest, wealthiest part of Houston with the Galleria and River Oaks and the area around Rights and Diversity and all the nice places where wealthy Texans live is now represented by a Democrat. Why? Write-ins. Take a look at -- at the Georgia six. The $40 million special elections that we heard so much about last spring. Karen Handel a mod- -- genuinely moderate Republican, arguably a RINO herself, carried the seat narrowly in the face of that onslaught, but lost. Now this was a seat the Romney carried by 23 points. It was considered so -- so impregnably safe, but Trump only won 48 percent -- 48.6 percent in 2016. And you’ll look at the election return and find that Karen Handel was within a few tenths of a percent of that point. Again, the revenge of the RINOS. They felt kicked out of their party and they’ve turned against the party at least for the time being. That’s true in even some of the surprises. Oklahoma City. You wouldn’t think of Oklahoma City as a RINO preserve, but, in fact, the Oklahoma Metropolitan area turned -- went from 59 percent Romney to 53 percent Romney and now 53 percent Trump and have elected a Democrat very narrowly. Charleston, the seat where Mark Sanford was unseated by a conservative self-described Trumpian Katie Arrington. It was the one part of South Carolina outside of the state capitol that turned from Romney towards -- from Romney towards Clinton and she lost the seat very narrowly. (Inaudible) has some disappointed Sanford loyalists in there as well, you know, thinking we’ll get her out and our guy could come back. But it’s the same trend. Even in areas that aren’t wealthy by national standards, if by state standards you are the wealthiest and the educated district you swung in a way that was inconsistent with your entire previous decade’s long voting history. If this trend continues this places a lot of the southwest in harm’s
way for the Republicans. Kyrsten Sinema wins Arizona. Well, they still have about a quarter million ballots to cast. It would require an amazing comeback at this point for the Republicans win. She wins because she does not do better among Latinos, she does not do well in the outer areas, the rural areas. She wins suburban Phoenix. She becomes the first Democrat to carry the Phoenix Metropolitan area in the last 20 years and that’s because of RINO. So if this happens, then that places the Republicans in grave danger in urban United States like Florida or Georgia or Texas where Beto O’Rourke almost won. But there is a second election and this is the election that gave Republicans a net gain of either two or three in the Senate depending on what hap - -- or one or two independent -- depending what happens with Florida. It’s the gain that gave the Mike Dewine as governor of Ohio and Kim Reynolds as governor of Iowa even though all the polls had them trailing out -- either outside the margin of error or at the extreme edge of the margin of error. It also propelled two Senate candidates who had been completely written off by the national committees -- John James in Michigan and Jim Renacci in Ohio -- to narrow single-digit losses when based on the amount of money they were spending and based on the attention they were getting everyone expected them to lose by 10 percent or more. And then if you look at the returns outside the suburbs, as I said in my summary the people who I call TIGERS -- we have animal -- cute animal names for moderate -- cute animal names for moderates of a different variety. The blue collar Trump voter. Trump is great Republicans. That’s what TIGER stands for. In their native habitat TIGERS are quite numerous. And what you find is that across the Midwest the reason these Democratic Senators lost was not because of a generalized turn, but a very localized turn in the TIGER counties. The same places that moved dramatically from Obama to Trump. Let’s take a look at Indiana. If you look at Indianapolis and its two largest suburbs, those which cast about a quarter of the state vote. Incumbent Joe Donnelly does not lose votes. He gains votes in the wealthiest county, Hamilton. He basically holds even in the county of Indianapolis, Marion County, and in Hendricks County. So that’s -- he gets wiped out because everywhere else, the rural counties, he’s dropping dramatically from his victory margin of 2012. Exactly the same places where Trump did well. I called the race for him -- for Braun on election night. I complete with the networks on Twitter. Sometimes -- sometimes they listen. Brit Hume gave me a shout out, you
know, “Henry Olsen said this about” -- sometimes they get ticked off. I called it for Indiana because I was waiting for four industrial Democratic counties, the depressed steal towns around Gary and St. Josephs to come in. Donnelly had won those by 20 and 30 points in 2012. His margins were cut in half or more this time. These areas have swung dramatically to Trump. Exactly what you would expect. Depressed steal town. I want to make America great again. They want their jobs to come back again and they came through when Trump wasn’t on the ballot.

Take a look at Missouri. Missouri is a state that’s got tons of rural counties and few very large populated urban counties. Look at St. Louis County and St. Louis City, Green County in the center of the state which is Columbia, the University of Missouri, Kansas City and its suburbs. You take a look at those six counties and compared to her victory margin in 2012 she should be coming back. She doesn't lose many votes if at all. What happened is she gets wiped out in the other 90 counties of the state. Lots that she had carried that -- along with the trend that if you were a rural Obama liking, Trump liking Democrat you came home. Even in states that Democrats won that was the case. Take a look at Montana. Montana, Tester had a four-point margin in 2012. He won by three points on election night. You look at the large counties that cast 40 percent of the state vote, Tester actually improves his margin. You know, you look at Missoula where the University of Montana is or Gallatin where Big Sky Resort and Bozeman and Montana State are and he improves his vote. The next three largest counties he loses by just enough to make it a 50/50 race. So you look at -- and you look at two-thirds of the state vote he’s gained. Why is it close? He gets wiped out in the other 30 where rural, small town Montana come from and almost brings home a candidate to -- had Rosendale. But only as badly as Denny Ray Burk had done six years earlier in the urban areas he would have done this. And, you know, let’s go back to those Senate races. You take a look at John James. In 2012 Debbie Stabenl carries in every county in the upper peninsula of Michigan. It’s a blue collar, hard scrabble money area. On election night she carries two. Margins -- her margins shift by as much as 30 percent or more in some of these places. Take a look at auto, industrial areas that are depressed, Bay County, Genesee County, again, you see 20 to 30 point shifts. She’s saved because of high income suburbs in university towns again. So this bodes well for Donald Trump that if on the one hand the suburbs put red states in play that weren’t in play before,
without him being on the ballot his magic managed to transfer itself even to candidates who ran no campaigns. Which means that only a slight improvement in his performance -- if he can make a contrast that scares some of the RINOS back into his camp and keeps the loyalty of the TIGERS, he can lose the popular vote again but he’ll win the electoral and college pretty easily. He’ll come back and he’ll win Michigan, he’ll win Ohio, he’ll win Iowa, he’ll be competitive and maybe win Pennsylvania again, maybe even win New Hampshire. And that stand for our democracy to win with the minority of the popular vote, but Donald Trump -- he said if we had a popular vote I’d campaign differently. It’s Electoral College. I’m campaigning to win the Electoral College. So I would not take this as a clear repudiation of Trump. I’d rather say that we have one part of the country which repudiated Trump and the other which quietly endorsed him. And that’s the lay of the land. A few notes from the exit polls that I think are important. For all of the talk about partisan enthusiasm, in fact, the partisan breakdown did not change in a significant way at all. The Democratic percentage picked up from 36 to 37 as the electorate according to the exit poll, but that’s surely a rounding error because in 20- -- if you add it up from 2016 it was 36, 33, 30 so there was 1 percent left out. And now it’s 37, 33, 30 so it’s like tenths of a percent. Self-described Democrats showed up, self-described Republicans showed up. Both sides partisans showed up. The election was moved because independents switched. Independents backed Donald Trump narrowly 51 -- with 51 percent of the vote. They backed Democrats narrowly with 51 or 52 percent of the vote this time. This is very typical that we’ve seen dramatic shifts from 2008 to 2010, 2010 to 2012 and so forth. In every election the partisan balance does not shift significantly and the election outcome is decided by self-described independents moving dramatically from one side or another. Moving from a 5 to 10 to 12 point edge on one side to moving it onto the other side. Underneath that in 2016 the reason Trump wins is because independent women voted for Clinton, but independent men voted for him. In 2018 independent and independent men voted for the Democrat. They move in similar margin which is to say that independent move from voting for Clinton by a significant margin, voted for Democrats in landslide margin and independent move -- men move from voting Trump narrowing to voting for the Democrats narrowly. But it was not solely a women phenomena here. It was an independent phenomena.
Trump approval is the single most indicative factor of whether Republican will win. I looked at the five -- five or six closest Senate races last night. In every single one if you approved of Trump the Republican received between 88 and 90 percent of the vote and the Democrat received between 8 and 10 percent of the vote. Didn’t matter whether you were Rick Scott with a record of you own or whether you were Matt Rosendale in Montana. You know, if you were for Trump it was, you know, within the statistical error you got the -- the Trump supporter voted for the Republican in the same margins regardless of who the candidate was. So the candidates win or lose depending on what the Trump job approval rating is. And where it’s 51 percent in Montana Matt Rosendale falls short because one thing we’ve learned is that, well, 10 percent of Trump approvers voted for the Democrat, only 5 percent of the disapprovers voted for the Republican. So there was a loss of a couple of percent on the balance there and that’s due to the intensity of the hatred for Donald Trump. Get about 53 percent and you’re very likely to win. Again, we’ve spent hundreds of millions of dollars talking about healthcare and individual candidates and my view is that in the end of it it was all in most cases a bunch of hooey. People won because it’s a nationalized parliamentary style election and if you had an R next to your name you were Trumpian and if you had a D next to your name you were not Trumpian and everything else was window dressing. Democrats I’m sure will disagree with that. They want to tell you that preexisting health -- preexisting conditions was the, you know, spear that lanced the side of the Republicans and it wasn’t holy water that was coming out, it was real blood. And they did that, but -- but no. What I believe the preexisting conditions did is give a rational reason for people to exercise their preexisting partisan commitments. United independents who wanted to vote Democrat and Democrats who wanted to vote Democrat. So, yeah, I’m for this person not because I hate Donald Trump and the Republican Party, but because I want preexisting condition. And that’s something that a good campaign can do is give a rational reason for not irrational actions, but for less acceptable. You know, people are -- but like I said, I’m just a partisan about that to say, you know (inaudible). So it’s a good campaign and you can give them that. There’s lots of other things to say, but going forward I think we are still a nation divided. And a nation divided deeply on questions of value. And the piece I sent to the Guardian I quoted Benjamin Disraeli who had a novel Sybil, or the
Two Nations. It talks about the England of the 19th Century being divided between rich and poor. County -- and they had no intercourse between them. They know nothing of their -- of the -- of feelings of the other side. There’s no empathy. And I think that remains unfortunately true here. We had John Edwards was all too (inaudible) when he talked about two Americas. But, again, it’s not between the rich and the poor in this country although there clearly are different divide. The animating division of our time is between the educated and the well-to-do and the less educated and the less well-to do. And that is a question that’s going to run into the 2020 election and be the overriding factor that both Democratic nominee and President Trump will have to respond to.

MR. GOOD: Thank you, Henry, for stirring the pot and opening things up. I want to remind you if you want to get in -- several of you are already on the list -- please get attention and we’ll make sure that happens. And from two elections an increased entrenchment over to sort of the faith angle, the religious landscape beneath the surface of things Al Cooperman.

ALAN COOPERMAN

MR. COOPERMAN: Well, thank you, Josh. Thank you, Henry. That was provocative. And I like the notion of “preexisting conditions” [referring to] being a Democrat or a Republican. I have some handouts and Mark’s passing them out. While he’s doing that, let me just give a quick introduction.

Today I’m going to try to talk about religion’s role in the midterm elections, but I’m a bit hamstrung. I told you this in advance. We are limited by what is available from the exit polls. Exit polls provide vital data and, you know, it’s sort of an obvious thing: If all we had was vote counts, we wouldn’t have any idea who voted, actually, or why they voted. And, really, all the data we have at this time comes from the exit polls.

On the one hand, the exit polls are an incredible thing from a pollster’s point of view: People fanning out to more than 1,000 places all over the country, collecting enormous amount of data, processing it in an incredibly short time, and providing it to the networks so that they can provide some color commentary and analysis in their evening essays as they talk about the election results. But, on the other hand, the [questionnaire] form that’s used in the exit polls is a relatively short form and pretty simple, and it changes from time to time. So, as one wag says, the exit polls are like the world’s greatest kazoo band, right? And reading the exit polls two days after the
election is like listening to the world’s greatest kazoo band play the entirety of Beethoven’s 9th. I mean, it’s sort of incredible, but it’s really not a fulfilling, moving musical experience. And so I have to tell you that while we have some data here to look at, I’m not fully satisfied with it, and I suspect that you won’t be either. But it’s the best we can do at the moment.

So let’s start at the beginning. Let’s walk through this a little bit together. I know there’s a temptation to start flipping through the pages [of the handouts], but let’s go through it together. We’ll interrogate the data together… and see if they’ll confess!

First, I do have to say this, even though many of you know it: at the Pew Research Center, we’re not only non-profit and non-partisan, but also we’re a non-advocacy organization, which means we do not take policy positions on anything, and I have to stick to that today. So I won’t be able to say the kinds of things that Henry can say. I’m going to try to stick to what we know from the data.

The first thing to note is that, in many ways, what happened in this midterm election, in terms of the way that religious groups voted, is not a surprise in any way. I mean, it’s exactly consistent with what you would have expected. So the fourth slide is, for many people, the money slide here. It’s a really important one. You’ll see born-again and evangelical Christians -- and, by the way, that’s not just Protestants, because the exit poll asked the “born-again or evangelical” question of everybody, so you get some Mormons, you get some Catholics, you get some who-knows-what people describing themselves as “born-again” or “evangelical,” so it’s a bit of a mish-mash of a category -- but, anyway, looking back at recent elections, the exact same share voted Republican as in the past midterms. In all of these slides, I’m comparing midterms to midterms. I think that’s apples to apples. I’m not going to compare midterms to presidential years, although we can talk about presidential years if you want.

So, you see evangelicals on the whole -- that’s self-identified evangelical Christians -- voted just as strongly for Republicans in this election as they have in the past.

You also see that the group on the other end of the spectrum, as you all know, is the religiously unaffiliated, or religious “nones.” That’s N-O-N- E-S, those who identify as atheist, agnostic, or nothing in particular -- that don’t
identify with any religious group -- consistently have voted Democratic in recent elections. And once again, by virtually the same proportion as in the last two midterms, they voted strongly for Democratic candidates across the board.

All right. But there are some changes. One of them -- Tom Gjelten already talked about this on the air, and others I think have all noted this -- is Catholics. Catholics moved, at least by comparison with the last midterm, a bit more into the Democratic column. And this reminds me of the old joke, among political scientists, that spending hundreds of millions of dollars on national elections is really sort of a waste, because American elections usually come down to just one thing. My tongue-in-cheek proposal would be very simply: America should just let Catholics vote. You know, just the Catholics – because where Catholics go, the country goes invariably. So we can save so much money by just having Catholics vote. That’s not a serious...

MALE SPEAKER: As a lapsed Catholic may I –

MR. COOPERMAN: -- policy proposal. But Catholics are a bellwether, Catholics as a whole. Now all of you are sophisticated readers of data, and you’re immediately going to say: But what about Hispanic Catholics? What about white Catholics? We’ll talk about that in a little bit. That’s one of my frustrations with the exit polls. Not much we’re actually able to say there, about sub-groups of Catholics.

Another group – and, here, this is in the eye of the beholder, so you tell me. We’re looking at the same data. Did Jews move in this election, or did they not? Because we don’t have data for Jews in the 2010 midterms. So by comparison with 2014, yes, we had a little bit of a Democratic shift – but as Henry pointed out, the electorate as a whole moved a little bit into the Democratic column in this election. And if you want my personal assessment, my eye – I don’t consider this to be much of a move among American Jews, but maybe a tiny bit. So those are two nominees for things that potentially you might consider to be a change in the religious spectrum in this election: Catholics and Jews.

Here’s one other that I think is unambiguous and potentially important. It’s on slide number 9, and I’ve circled it. And that is that the share of the electorate -- actual voters, not the eligible electorate – the share of people who
voted who are religious “nones” – that is religiously unaffiliated (atheists, agnostics, or nothing in particular) has been rising. And it rose in this election. It’s still lower than their share of the population; “nones” now are pushing a quarter of the total U.S. adult population, so at 17 percent of the voters in this election, according to the exit polls, they’re still punching well below their weight. They’re young. They’re “nones,” right? They’re unaffiliated. They’re unconnected to some degree. Maybe the two things go hand and hand. They’re not as fully participatory in American democracy as some other groups like, for example, white evangelical Christians. But they are rising as a share of the electorate, and we saw a 5-percentage point increase in the share of the electorate made up of “nones,” from 12 percent in 2014 to 17 percent in 2018. And “nones” are, once again, very strongly Democratic in this election.

Now if “nones” are rising, whose share of the electorate dropped? You’ll notice that the Catholic share did not drop. You’ll notice on another line -- because it’s a different category, because it brings race into the equation – the share of voters in the exit poll category of white “evangelical or born-again Christians,” that share also did not drop. White evangelicals turned out in the same proportion that they’ve turned out in other recent midterms. So where did the votes come from? Whose share of the electorate did drop? It’s in the broad “Protestant” category. That includes the mainline Protestant (non-evangelical) category and “other” Christians, such as Mormons. So, again, that’s another problem this time in the exit polls, which I’ll talk about a little bit at the end. Mormons are in this combined “Protestant/other Christian” category. They’re not broken out separately in the exit poll data, because of the way the exit poll question was asked this time.

But you can see a commensurate drop in the share of -- if you’re looking at these last two columns, 2014 to 2018 -- the share of the electorate composed by “Protestant/other Christians” dropped from 53 to 47 percent, and the share of religiously unaffiliated rose from 12 to 17 percent. And, by the way -- though, again, I said I’m not going to compare this directly with presidential years -- if you sort of want to pencil it in, in 2016 the Protestant/other Christian category was about 52 percent, roughly, and the religiously unaffiliated was 15 percent. So the jump from 12 percent to 17 percent, that’s not just some sort of weird spike. That reflects the rising share of the
population that’s composed of people who are religiously unaffiliated, sometimes called the “nones.” As a share of the electorate vote, again, they’re still punching below their weight. But their numbers are increasing.

All right. Now I’ve got a bunch of straw men, or straw women, that I’d like to talk about. I’m calling them “myths.” You may, or may not, think these are real myths that many people believe. But they’re things I hear people assert. Let’s knock them down a little bit.

One of them, we’ve already sort of touched on: It’s the notion that evangelicals are turning liberal and turning against Trump. And, you know, anecdotally, I’m sure we can find some. But I don’t –

**MALE SPEAKER:** There’s one in this room.

**MR. COOPERMAN:** OK, but I don’t see it in the national data. Slide 11 is showing you presidential approval, and this is Pew Research Center data. This is aggregated over multiple polls. This is not exit poll data, and this was prior to the election. But, we see no drop, really. I see a lot of stability in the approval ratings of Donald Trump among -- now we’re talking, since this is Pew data, a more clean category -- white, self-identified, born-again or evangelical Protestants. Still, right up before the election, in the last several months of aggregated data from our polling, we saw 71 percent approval ratings for the president from that group. And the next slide, slide 12: You can see that, if anything, party ID among the white evangelical Protestants is trending more Republican. So this notion that, somehow, white evangelical Protestants as a whole are turning more liberal, I don’t see. I could show you more data, but I don’t see it anywhere.

A second myth, which is a sort of fine tuning of the first myth, is: It’s not evangelicals as a whole that are turning more liberal, it’s the young ones. The myth is that evangelicals are losing their youth, and young evangelical Protestants are much more liberal than their elders. And, in fact, that’s true on some issues. It’s especially true on homosexuality and same-sex marriage. But it’s not true on abortion, and it’s not true in terms of party identification. I’ve circled for you on slide number 14, at the bottom, the critical comparison. White evangelical Protestants who are millennials: 66 percent of them either identify as Republican or lean Republican in our polling, compared with 65 percent of the older generations.
Now you’ll see, if you look at issues like environmental regulations: Do those regulations hurt the economy and cost jobs, or do they help make our lives better? Younger millennials are more liberal on that question. They’re also less antagonistic toward immigration. They’re less likely to oppose same-sex marriage. But on abortion, the younger evangelicals are just as strongly, or more strongly, opposed to abortion as older evangelicals. And, again, there’s no difference, in terms of party ID, between the youngest cohort and the older cohorts of evangelicals.

So we can dig a little deeper into this, because you might even think: OK, well, maybe millennial white evangelicals aren’t really any more liberal in their party ID and their partisanship than older ones, but somehow I have a sense, you might say to yourself, that younger people in general are more liberal. We do see that in the data. So you might think, aren’t they going to gradually move their religious groups to the left? Isn’t that going happen?

I can’t predict the future. I don’t have a crystal ball. I don’t know. It is true that younger folks, on the whole, are more liberal, more left-leaning, than older Americans today. But I think there’s reason to be cautious and not to assume that, inevitably, they’re going to move their religious groups to the left as a whole. And I’ve got a bunch of slides basically designed to explore that. And you can look through these yourselves, but you’ll see on slides 15 through 20 -- here we’re breaking down each of the major religious groups in the country by generation. And to my eye, at least, in most of these categories, I don’t see a clear line in which the younger generation is more Democratic-leaning than the older generation. It’s not true among white evangelicals. You see the numbers here on slide 15. It’s not true among the white mainline Protestants. It’s not true among black Protestants. It’s not true among white Catholics. It’s not especially true among Hispanic Catholics. We’ve got some missing data for the Silent generation. And there is one group where it IS true, to some extent, to my eye. Again, we’re all, as I said, interrogating the same data, trying to make it confess! I would say, on slide 16, if you look at the very bottom set of numbers for millennials, the religiously unaffiliated millennials look more liberal to me, and it looks to me like we’ve got some movement, perhaps. Basically what I’m trying to say is: One hypothesis is that when young people -- when the younger generations within each of these religious groups -- find themselves at odds with the prevailing politics of that religious group, what do they do? Do they move that religious group to the left, or do
they leave that religious group and become unaffiliated? And I, again, I don’t know what will happen. I can’t tell you this as a matter of fact. But as a hypothesis, it’s entirely possible that what will happen is, they will leave and become unaffiliated. The unaffiliated are growing, and as they grow in numbers, the unaffiliated are, if anything, becoming more liberal, generation by generation, rather than the biggest religious groups in the country becoming more left-leaning with this generational change.

And, again, you see the same patterns if we look at specific issues, like abortion. You will see that it is not the case that across these various religious groups, the younger folks are, again and again and again, more willing to countenance legal abortion. It’s not just the case that among white evangelical Protestants the millennial generation is more opposed to legal abortion than older. It’s also – to my eye, again, if you look at these numbers on attitudes toward abortion – true among white mainline Protestants. And I see no significant differences between generations among black Protestants. I see no generational differences among white Catholics as a whole. Hispanic Catholics, I don’t see much difference by generation. But the unaffiliated -- even among the unaffiliated you don’t see much more, or less, opposition to abortion among younger unaffiliated than among older unaffiliated adults. So abortion is one of those things that seems to be baked into the cake and not changing by generation.

Same-sex marriage is totally the opposite, completely different. Every group -- every group – in this society, by generation, is becoming more willing to accept same-sex marriage. It’s what sociologists call a “period effect.” It’s not so much generational – I mean, it could be partly generational change, but it seems like it’s something that’s affecting the entire society, every group. So, again, just run your eyes down these numbers, and you’ll see that among black Protestants, the younger generations are more likely to favor same-sex marriage. Look at white mainline Protestants, the same thing. Younger white evangelicals are also more likely than older white evangelicals to support same-sex marriage. And so on for white Catholics, Hispanic Catholics, and, of course, the unaffiliated. Every group has shifted. The whole society has shifted on this issue. All right? So, I’m sorry, let’s kick that myth down.
Okay. Myth number 3. This is really, probably, my favorite of the myths, because I hear this a lot. I don’t know whether you all hear this, but I constantly have, ever since the 2016 primary, heard this from religious leaders. Especially you heard this from more moderate or left-leaning evangelicals themselves -- you all know the names -- who said: “Yes, your polling shows that evangelicals strongly support Trump, but the real evangelicals, the ones who are really in church each week, the ones who are really walking the walk religiously, they’re not so supportive of Trump.” And I’m looking at the data, and I can’t find that to be the case. I mean, it’s not like I’m morally opposed to that being the case, but I just don’t see data that indicates it. So, on slide number 22, we’re looking at approval ratings for Trump over the last few years, and I broke it out among white evangelical Protestants. This is Pew data, showing those who attend church weekly versus those who attend less than weekly, right? The so-called “real” evangelicals -- that’s the people who are really in the pews -- their approval rates for Donald Trump are just as high as among the self-identifying evangelicals who aren’t in church, or who aren’t in church as often. It’s ditto, by the way, for white Catholics, because you sometimes hear this myth about Catholics. The regular Mass-attending Catholics are just as high in their approval of Trump as the less frequent Mass attenders. And slide 24 is breaking this out again and showing you the trends over time. Both the weekly attenders and the less than weekly attenders among self-identifying white evangelical Protestants have been, in their party identification, moving Republican, not the reverse. Catholics are kind of a mixed bag, as always, especially the less frequently attending Catholics. If you look at that slide -- the slide to the right-hand side of the page on page 25 -- you’ll see Catholics again being that kind of bellwether.

Another myth is the idea that white evangelicals are abandoning the evangelical name: it’s become tarnished and they’re running away from the name. They don’t want to be called evangelicals anymore. I can find people who will tell you that. But, again, I don’t see it in the data. I really like this set of slides. I hope you enjoy them, too. Start with slide 27 and we see something: yes, it is absolutely true that the share of U.S. adults who identify as white evangelical Protestants has been declining. It’s going down. But -- and we see this on page 28 -- that’s because the share of U.S. adults who are white has been going down. And -- you’ll see this on slide 29 -- because
the share of whites who are Christian also has been going down. But if you take as your base -- on slide 30 -- whites who are Christian -- the share of whites who are Christian who are self-identifying as evangelical is stable. In other words, among white Christians, evangelical identity does not appear to be declining.

Because I often travel in Jewish circles, I sometimes hear this fifth myth: that Jews are turning Republican. And there’s a lot of reason to think this could be the case. We do see that Republicans are more supportive of Israel on the whole, and by any number of polling measures, than Democrats. We also know that Orthodox Jews lean Republican, while Jews as a whole lean Democratic. And we know that the Orthodox are growing as a percentage of the Jewish population. So, it’s not a crazy idea that Jews, who for years and years have been a reliable Democratic constituency, might be turning gradually a bit more Republican. But I don’t see it, at least in these midterm elections. Again, we saw this slide once before, but -- if anything -- Jews moved a little bit more to the Democratic side of the ledger in these midterm elections. And if we look back at party ID, going all the way back to 1994 in Pew Research Center polling among people who self-identify as Jewish by religion -- who identify with the Jewish faith -- they’re consistently Democratic. And while the -- you know, the line moves around a little bit -- to me it looks like overall stability. This is page 33. In other words, I just don’t see evidence. Page 33 is giving you close to 15 years of trend data, and there is no significant movement of Jews into the Republican column. Now John [Podhoretz] or others may take issue with this, but it’s hard for me to see.

MALE SPEAKER: You’re talking about slide 33 here?

MR. COOPERMAN: Yeah. We’re on slide 33.

MALE SPEAKER: So 24 to 31 [percent of Jews who identify as Republican or lean Republican] is not significant to you?

MR. COOPERMAN: You know, it [the level of Jewish identification with the Republican Party, measured over time] bounces around, but no -- because the other thing to consider is that [on the other side of the ledger, which is support for the Democratic Party, Jews have barely moved from] 69 percent [in 1994] to 67 percent [in 2017]. So maybe some movement is coming [toward the GOP] now, but without any significant decline over time in support
for the Democrats. This trend line is “leaned” -- there’s no independents in here – it’s showing Republicans plus those who lean Republican, and Democrats plus those who lean Democratic. So, from 24 [percent Rep/lean Rep in 1994] to 31 [percent Dem/lean Dem in 2017], would that be significant if it were a straight line with no bouncing around? Yes. And if you want think of that as a gradual shift, go ahead. But bear in mind, as you can see, that it [Jewish support for the GOP] has gone up and down quite a bit in between [1994 and 2017]. And there’s no decline in the Democratic [numbers over the same period].

Sometimes I hear Democrats described these days -- I’ve seen this in print -- as the party of the non-religious and the Republicans as the party of the religious. And, again, there’s a little truth to this. On Slide 35, you can see a scale where we’ve combined a bunch of measures of religiosity, including self-reported attendance at religious services, levels of prayer, and how important people say religion is in their lives. Obviously, who is considered highly religious is going to depend on where we make the artificial cut points -- how we define low religiosity, medium religiosity and high religiosity. But pretty much no matter where you put those cut points, you’re going to find that the share of Republicans who are low in religiosity is smaller than the share of Democrats who are low in religiosity.

At the same time, there are a lot of religious Democrats. And this is looking at Democrats as a whole. Where I think it gets really much more interesting is the next slide, slide 36. Let’s break Democrats down. Let’s look at white Democrats, black Democrats, and Hispanic Democrats. And what you see -- and if you can visually take your finger and sort of compare the black Democrats to the Republicans and you see, wow, by standard measures, black Democrats are more religious than Republicans as a whole. And if you look at Hispanic Democrats, they’re about as religious as Republicans as a whole. So the group that’s actually less religious isn’t all Democrats. It’s white Democrats. White Democrats are the comparatively non-religious group. And on slide 37, you can see this. If we just break down whites, we see pretty clearly what’s going on here, which is that the highly religious whites are most likely to favor the Republican Party. The less religious whites are most likely to favor the Democratic Party. And, again, what’s high, medium or low depends on your cut points. But, even though you can argue with
the cut points, you’re going to see the same pattern pretty much no matter where you put the cut points. So, what I’m trying to say is that, in a sense – and I hope nobody takes this as a partisan statement, because I don’t mean it that way -- the Republican Party is, if we’re looking just among whites, the party of highly religious whites, and the Democratic Party is the party of less religious whites. That’s leaving the others out of the equation. Now if we look at non-whites, including Hispanics and African Americans, what do we see? The Democratic Party is the party of the highly religious non-whites.

Lastly, and I know my time is really out, but I just want to tell you why I’m -- I hope this has been somewhat illuminating, but why personally I find it unfulfilling. We don’t know what the vote was among white Catholics versus Hispanic Catholics this time, because it hasn’t been reported yet from the exit polls, at least that I’ve seen. I’m sure it will be. It has been in previous elections. But we’re at the mercy of what the owners of the exit poll have released, and they haven’t released that yet. And there’s one reason why they, perhaps, haven’t released it. Pay attention to the fine print, so to speak. On page 41, I have reproduced for you two paragraphs from Edison Research’s press release about the exit polls. And the thing to realize is that for numerous past elections, there is pretty clear evidence that the exit polls have overstated the educated vote, and they’ve tended to overstate the non-white vote. And so, this time around, that had become so abundantly clear that the exit poll has incorporated new weighting measures which have not been made fully public, but they did disclose it in their press release. And you’ll note -- I mean, I know it sounds sort of wonky, but it says the exit poll will be adjusted for non-response by education and by age using a parameter developed by comparing past Census estimates of turnout among these groups and past exit poll estimates of turnout among these groups. So the exit polls themselves now are being weighted to age and education within racial categories. So that then means that what you might think of as an outcome variable is a weighting variable. And it means that the exit polls may be more accurate, but trending -- comparing this set of exit polls to the previous exit polls -- is going to be very difficult.

Plus, the exit poll questions have changed. They dropped Mormons as a category in the religious identification question. So, if you ask me, what do the exit poll trends look like by race? You can tell from this set of exit polls
what the share of voters who were non-white, white, African American, et cetera. But comparing that to previous, unweighted data -- unless they go back and re-weight the previous data, which they haven’t done, or certainly haven’t said they have done -- we don’t know, what do the trends look like by age. Age is a really important story in this election. But what share of the electorate was younger voters this time, and how does that compare with past figures? Well, we know what share of the electorate was young voters this time. But we don’t have a clear comparison to past midterms, because the exit polls were weighted by age this time, and they weren’t in the past. Again, for Hispanic Catholics, we can’t -- even their voter turnout as a whole, is, at this point, still a mystery. Better data will come. The [U.S. Census Bureau’s] Current Population Survey will give us some turnout data. We will go back, six months from now, a year from now, five years from now, we will know much better what happened in this midterm than we do today. And I apologize for that. But we’re just at the mercy of the available data.

MR. PODHORETZ: Quick -- quick question following up on Carl’s. On slide 11 –

MR. COOPERMAN: Yes.

MR. PODHORETZ: -- you have the white evangelical trend and you have 78 percent in February/April of 2017 and 71 percent in the spring/summer of ’18. That’s a 10 percent shift. Now maybe –

MR. COOPERMAN: That’s not 10 –

MR. PODHORETZ: -- It’s 10 percent. I mean, you know.

MR. COOPERMAN: 78 to 71 is a 7-point –

MR. PODHORETZ: 7 percent, right. 7 out of 78.

MR. COOPERMAN: Yes, OK.

MR. PODHORETZ: So, it’s a 10-percent shift down, but you said you don’t see that as a measurable decline. I’m –

MR. COOPERMAN: Yeah.

MR. PODHORETZ: Because I don’t know what the margin, if there’s a margin of error or whatever. I just still think that is a real thing. It’s not like 3 points, it’s 7.
MR. COOPERMAN: Right.

FEMALE SPEAKER: (Inaudible.)

MALE SPEAKER: Where?

FEMALE SPEAKER: (Inaudible.)

MR. COOPERMAN: So, look, we’re all –

MR. PODHORETZ: That’s all I’m asking. I just want to know why –

MR. COOPERMAN: I understand.

MR. PODHORETZ: -- you say that –

MR. COOPERMAN: No, I understand. And I’ll try to give you a quick answer. But I say, look, it’s a good point and good observation. We’re all looking at the same data and our eyes, you know –

MR. PODHORETZ: Uh-huh.

MR. COOPERMAN: -- so it’s somewhat in the eye of the beholder. I’m just so accustomed to looking at fever lines and not paying attention to things that aren’t consistently moving in one direction or the other, because, in the meantime [between early 2017 and mid-2018] you have a 67 percent number, so that, if anything, it was possibly a bit lower at one point than 71 percent. Plus, if you’re going to compare any two polls, you’ve got to add the margin of error to both –

MR. PODHORETZ: Right.

MR. COOPERMAN: -- polls. You probably have a three- or four-point margin of error, so you’re -- whether this is statistically significant or not, at a 95-percent confidence interval, I don’t know. But, look, I sometimes, when I look at these things I agree with you. I try to remember what Woody Allen said about casual sex. You know what Woody Allen said? “Casual sex is a meaningless experience. But, as meaningless experiences go, it’s one of the best.”

MR. PODHORETZ: Right.

MR. COOPERMAN: And so, this is the way I sometimes think about margins of error and statistical significance. It
may be a statistically insignificant difference, but of statistically insignificant differences, it’s one of the most interesting. Because at some confidence level -- maybe not at 95 percent, maybe at an 80-percent or a 60-percent confidence level, it IS statistically significant. But I would say that what’s going on here -- remember, these are aggregated polls. In order to get enough people to look at, we’re pulling in three and four months’ worth of polling data -- not one single poll, but multiple polls. And if I pulled different sets of polls, these lines would move around a little bit. And to my -- you’ll excuse me for saying this, this is going to sound awful -- but to my somewhat trained or at least experienced --

MR. PODHORETZ: Yeah.

MR. COOPERMAN: -- eye, when I see a line sort of bumping around and not clearly going down or clearly going up, I’m more likely to call it stability rather than change.

**Q&A 1**

**QUESTION 1**

MR. FERGUSON: Okay. This is for Henry just real quick. You said this is really a nationalized election sort of in disguise. Would the Democrats have been smarter to hit -- make Trump the issue then rather than talking about these sorts of -- ?

MR. OLSN: No. I don’t think so because Trump was already the issue. I think by hitting on Trump constantly they might have actually caused some people to feel a little less good about their inclination to go into another direction. What I’m trying to say less than should they have made Trump the issue or not rather that I don’t believe that all of these ads that were run actually caused the people to change their minds. That typically what you find is that ads -- I looked at all -- at one point in mid-October I looked at all of the polls that the New York Times and Siena had done. And I compared how the Democrat and the Republican was fairing across different groups and it did not matter what the name ID was 90-something percent of Democrats said they were going to choose the Democrat. So what the ads do basically is run up a name ID, put out a favorable theme to remind Democrats, oh, yeah, this is the name of the person who you intend to vote for and then use it to rally leaning
partisans among the independents who are already predisposed to liking, but they need to have some idea of who you are. So did it cause them to move? No. What it did was ratify or -- a preexisting inclination that was -- that was set as opposed to sometimes when you can take a look at an ad and say a word for that ad and that issue, you know, this person runs significantly different than the partisan leaning of their area. This is an election where almost nobody runs significantly ahead of behind the partisan leader their area is measured by. The other thing the New York Times/Sinena polls is that Trump approval very closely tracked Repub-- generic ballot approval. That in RINO districts more people were likely to say -- slightly more people were likely to say they backed Republicans than said they like Trump which is what you’d expect. The poll between do I like Trump or do I like Republicans is in conflict. And the reverse was slightly true in TIGER district, but it was very closely linked. And very rarely did you see an -- a person, whether an incumbent or otherwise, run significantly ahead of that. And when the Times went back and polled districts the second time you actually saw the will-- the likelihood of running ahead of the partisan identifier to less of rather than increase.

QUESTION 2

MR. GJELTEN: I’d like both of you to weigh in on this if you could because there’s kind of a dead aspect to this question and also an ideological aspect. And that is what you see is the difference between the religious left and the religious right. I have a theory that there is a much bigger difference between the religious right and the secular right than there is between the religious left and the secular left. And I’m wondering whether there are any -- whether you have any insights or data that might be (inaudible).

MR. GOOD: Spell that out just for -- if you wouldn’t mind, Tom, on--

MR. GJELTEN: Well, for example, if I look at the -- if I look at the -- if I look let’s just say Faith in Public Life or something like that which is representing the religious left. Look at their positions, what they tweet about, what they talk about to me it’s like indistinguishable from Moveon.org. You know, I just don’t see any real -- I just -- in terms of the points that they want to make and emphasize. If you look at conservative right-wing evangelical Christians they may be as Republican as non-Christian Republicans but they -- they talk about very different things, you know. They tend to talk much more in terms of personal salvation and, you know, the various theological
points that distinguish them it’s just easier to see whether -- even something like same sex marriage it’s just for me easier to see distinctions between religious -- conservative religious Republicans and conservative non-religious Republicans.

MR. COOPERMAN: Defining religious left or religious right in data terms, that’s sort of a hard thing to do. And we’ve experimented in a variety of ways over the years, including by asking people whether they identify with, or know of and think of themselves as a part of, a movement such as the religious left or the religious right. And if I remember correctly, though we haven’t done this for a while, but we get a pretty sizeable number of Americans saying they know what the religious right is. We don’t ask them to define it. We just say, have you heard of such a thing [as the religious left and the religious right]. We get very, very few who say they know what the religious left is. And in that sense, it mirrors the history, that we all know, of the religious right as an organized movement coming about in the 1980s and early 90s. And, just to get back to exit polls, by the way, you remember that before 2002, the exit poll question was not about “born-again or evangelical Christians” but rather, the exit polls used to ask people whether they were “part of a movement called the religious right.” So it was a “thing,” so to speak. Religious right is a “thing.” I’m not sure whether religious left is a “thing.” I’m not saying there aren’t people who are both religious and left leaning, politically. I actually see it in the data: non-white Democrats, are on the whole, highly religious AND highly left in their partisanship and ideology. So there’s something you could call a religious left. But do they think of themselves as the religious left? Do they think of their politics as being entwined with their religion, et cetera? Could we prove that in the data? I don’t know. Does that help at all?

MR. GJELTEN: Yeah. No. I –

MR. COOPERMAN: And then in terms of the groups, you know, how they speak about it: This is anecdotal and you know as much as, or more than, I do about it. But I see a lot of religious leaders who are conservative in their political outlook and organizations, such as Focus on the Family, lots and lots of them, that speak about religion and politics together from a clearly conservative or right-wing perspective. There is some of that on the left, perhaps, but to my eye, it’s much less visible in terms of overtly political, organizational activity.
MR. OLSEN: I’ll speak to a couple of things. One, in the book -- my book the Four Faces of the Republican Party we -- my co-author and I distinguished between the people who say they’re very conservative and who we can show are motivated primarily by religious sentiment and people that are very conservative who say we don’t -- who are not that way. And there are very large differences between them. That the person who is very conservative and evangelical tends to pick candidates who talk about thought and social issues. The person who is very conservative who is not wants somebody to talk about liberty and taxes. So they both call themselves conservative, but they’re very different in what they emphasize. And often times what we found in -- as the candidates we know now is that when forced to choose between the candidate of God and the mushy middle business conservative, the secular conservative tended to like the business conservative rather than the God candidate even though they were both very conservative and would meet in the Heritage Foundation and shake hands and be, you know, fellows behind the secrets. At the voting booth they were not. Among non-rights one of the things that is interesting to me is looking at Pew data and some of the PRRI data is how when you measure things -- questions of orthodoxy or religiosity you’ll often find highly religious evangelical or highly religious Protestant (inaudible) similar views on things like the inherency of the Bible or -- and you can correct me if I’m -- if you’ve got -- the data that I’ve seen suggests that they are similar to white evangelical Protestant. Vastly dissimilar in their voting. Among Hispanics I saw one -- it might have been -- it was either yours or PRRI’s, Alan, where you had a sub -- enough people to be able to break out Hispanic evangelicals. And they’re the most Republican voting Hispanic --

MR. COOPERMAN: Yeah. That’s our data.

MR. OLSEN: I’m sorry?

MR. COOPERMAN: That’s our data because --

MR. OLSEN: Yeah.

MR. COOPERMAN: -- that comes from --

MR. OLSEN: And, you know, if you compared it and said, you know, are you believable (inaudible), do you believe
in, you know, the different measures that would signify orthodoxy they’re nearly indistinguishable from white evangelical, but they’re 35 percent less likely to vote and -- vote Republican. And I think it’s because there’s something cultural going on with white evangelical Protestantism that has to do with a lost state of status and that is not present for the non-white evangelical even if they’re every bit as orthodox. And that means that the dream of some people in the Bush era which would be create the Republican Party as a pan-racial, soft Christian Democratic Party was always going to meet a roadblock in that the very thing that would drive people of orthodoxy to be -- to be open to that among whites was not present among non-whites.

**MR. COOPERMAN:** I confirm that. I’ve actually pulled up the slide. On religious indicators, among born-again and evangelical Protestants, the whites and the non-whites are practically indistinguishable on religious matters. But on politics, they’re like two different worlds.

**QUESTION 3**

**MR. GOOD:** Will Saletan?

**MR. SALETAN:** (Inaudible.)

**MR. GOOD:** Please.

**MS. GRIEDER:** Yeah. I’m kind of -- this is a related question to this and this discussion. Do you think we’re just -- it’s possible we’re looking at this backwards that (inaudible) you see a growth in education of self-identified white evangelical Protestants as Republicans both among those who attend weekly and those who attend less than weekly (inaudible) between white evangelical Protestants and Latino evangelicals. Do you think it’s possible that it’s just Republicans are identifying themselves increasingly as evangelicals if they’re white?

**MR. COOPERMAN:** Well, the share of white evangelicals in the population is not increasing.

**MS. GRIEDER:** Right. But it’s not really clear what constitutes white evangelical, right? I mean, you may have Mormons, Catholics who say they are to the –

**MR. COOPERMAN:** Oh, in the exit polls, yes.

**MS. GRIEDER:** Yeah.

**MR. COOPERMAN:** But slide 24 is Pew Research Center data, and there we’re looking at white evangelical
MS. GRIEDER: Right.

MR. COOPERMAN: But so, yes, it’s possible that what’s -- it’s interesting, it’s a really interesting hypothesis. Let me see if I can restate it. So the idea is, you’re thinking that among Republicans, a growing share of Republicans are self-identifying as evangelical?

MS. GRIEDER: So in Pew when you’re doing (inaudible) how do you categorize white evangelicals? Do you ask them if they are and then you count them as one?

MR. COOPERMAN: We do it two different ways.

MS. GRIEDER: Okay.

MR. COOPERMAN: This [slide] is based on self-identifying as a born-again or evangelical.

MS. GRIEDER: Okay.

MR. COOPERMAN: We also, in our super big surveys in 2007 and 2014, do it by asking people what church they belong to.

MS. GRIEDER: Okay.

MR. COOPERMAN: And tracking the denomination of that church. So there’s a denominational measure, and there’s a self-identification measure. They go pretty closely hand in hand.

MS. GRIEDER: Uh-huh.

MR. COOPERMAN: I can look at that, Erica. I can flip the lens, go back, run the numbers and flip it. I will be surprised if we see a rising share of Republicans who identify as evangelical, but it’s possible.

MS. GRIEDER: (Inaudible) white Republicans -- white Republicans who are Christian and see (inaudible) evangelical outreach and having evangelicals in the White House (inaudible) with this administration. (Inaudible).

QUESTION 4

MR. GOOD: Yeah. I’ll see what I get. Will?

MR. SALETAN: Okay. I have two -- a small question for each of you and then one big question for the room and then I don’t know what to do about that so. The -- for Henry I wanted to ask about the -- I think your number was

Protestants, not Mormons or Catholics.
that Trump -- the Republicans underperformed Trump’s numbers because something like 10 percent of the Trump approvers voted Democrat, but 5 -- only 5 percent or so of the disapprovers. Is that normal for presidents or is Trump doing worse on that standard -- by the standard than, say, Reagan and the Bush’s?

**MR. OLSEN:** I haven’t looked at that. That’s an excellent question. I presume that it’s a little bit worse. One thing I noticed in the pre-election polls is that -- (inaudible) a little bit by the exit polls is that self-described part- -- typically you’ll see like 8 percent of self-described partisan Democrats vote for the Republican and a similar percentage among the Republicans so it balances out. This time there was a smaller defection among self-described Democrats. Again, not huge, but 3 percent vote for the Republican and still 8, 9, 10 percent of the Republicans vote for the Democrat and that I think carried over to the Trump approval rating. And the partisan rating I know is slightly unusual. Less that more Republicans defect, but that fewer Democrats defect. But I haven’t looked in past years at the presidential approval rating so I can’t -- and that defection rate so I can’t tell you.

**MR. SALETAN:** I mean, I’m just assuming that if it had been equal both ways that would have made an enormous difference in the outcome of the election.

**MR. OLSEN:** If it had been equal both ways Christian -- Kyrsten Sinema would probably lose Arizona very narrowly. She’s ahead by a point and a half right now. If it was an equalized rate McSally would be running about even with her. It’s not -- it’s not gonna be huge because you’re talking about 5 percent of like 30 percent or 5 percent of 40 percent so it’s only like a 2 percent thing. But a race that’s within a 1 or 2 percent margin that’s gonna decide it. So, you know, you take a look at some of these House races the Democrats win by .5 percent, yeah, an equalized rate means the Republican wins by .5.

**MR. SALETAN:** Okay. For Alan I just wanted to ask about so John and Erica were asking about drop slide 11, slide 22 with the white evangelical Protestants. It -- I mean, even if it comes back up -- even if it bounces up and down over the long term that looks to me -- to my eye that’s like I ask myself why this goes from 78 to 66. What happened in 2017? My question is basically is that just that group matching every other group in the drop in Trump’s approval rating or was there something in particular in that group in what would explain it?
MR. COOPERMAN: I don’t know. I honestly don’t know, and I’m very loath to try to guess what moves poll numbers up and down. Even when you know that something -- something big -- occurred in between two polls, it’s always speculation as to whether that particular event was the thing that drove the number up or drove the number down. I don’t think there’s a clear inference, an obvious inference, as to why -- if you see this as a decline, a seven-point decline -- why it took place. And in the meantime, there’s also been a four-point -- I don’t even want to call it a “rise,” because I don’t think it is a rise -- but another number in between. You know, we’re just going to agree to disagree on this. I see these numbers bouncing around. I don’t see this as a consistent decline that begs for an explanation.

MR. SALETAN: Okay. And my question for the room -- and I don’t ex-- -- you guys are -- you’re numbers guys so I don’t expect you to have an answer for this. But I continue to be fascinated by those numbers on same sex marriage and on abortion and it’s exactly what you said massive shift on one to generationally over time, but with -- not on the other issue. And my question is really not for the data guys but for the religious people. I mean, what are church -- are churches looking at numbers like this and asking not just, oh, how do we change minds that are not being changes or how do we preserve it, but what can we learn from this? There’s something fundamental about these two issues that explains why one of them is moving and one of them isn’t.

MR. PODHORETZ: Will, you -- you wrote an early piece on this very subject in relation to abortion as I recall. And I think the answer is ultra -- I think -- I’m not talking churching now. I think the answer is ultrasounds. I think everybody who has a baby now sees an eight-week ultrasound and that is a transformative experience. It’s a -- I’ve spoken to many friends of mine who are, you know, like dogmatically pro-choice and this is a very shaky ground for them once they see the ultrasound. There’s obviously no ultrasound for gay marriage to show that gay marriage isn’t what people say it is. So I think you have an actual scientific ad- -- the normalization of something that was not -- you know, was something that happened twice during pregnancy now happens five times before 20 weeks. And if it doesn’t harden people’s sense that that is a life on a mass scale I’d be very surprised.

MR. WARD: You could take a lot of the language John just used and use it in terms of gay marriage, in terms of
new data, in terms of people coming out, people having more relatives, children coming out it’s kind of like very similar I think.

**MR. COOPERMAN:** Yeah. Jon I think has raised an interesting issue about coming out, and what would be the analog to that in the abortion debate? So if you think that the critical moment in the LGBT movement changing of public opinion came in the 1980s, when people began to come out, to tell their friends and family, so that in polls the share of the American public who said they knew someone who was gay began to rise, rise, rise, and it continued to rise. And knowing someone who is LGBT, saying you personally know someone -- that’s strongly correlated with more positive attitudes on LGBT issues. So you could say that, maybe, that was the defining tactic that really won the [culture] war for that side. Many could say, well, but in the abortion debate, on the other side of it, you’ve got the ultrasound, and I’m not going to disagree with that. But you don’t have people -- in my life experience, and I don’t think we’ve done any polling on this, I don’t think we’ve ever asked. Maybe we should ask: Do you know somebody who’s had an abortion? -- But I don’t see a movement of people “coming out” to friends and family to say they have had an abortion. And I don’t know, would that make a difference?

**MR. SALETAN:** I’m just -- I think there’s probably some good poll questions you can draw up from that.

**MR. COOPERMAN:** I don’t know. You think –

**MALE SPEAKER:** Ask the ultrasound question.

**MR. COOPERMAN:** -- that’d be a good polling question? I think it’d --

**FEMALE SPEAKER:** Yes.

**MR. COOPERMAN:** -- be excellent. It’d be a rough question, but –

**MR. PODHORETZ:** You know, there was an effort I think in 2016. There was a sort of feminist effort printing up t-shirts saying I had an abortion, yes, I had an abortion, I had an abortion. And I -- I -- you know, have any -- you know, data or anything to suggest that -- that seems to have been dropped rather quickly because I think it made people very uncomfortable in general. People did it, they did it in Brooklyn. They may not do it in, you know, St. Louis Park, you know, in Minneapolis or, you know, somewhere where it’s not -- where it’s maybe not quite as,
you know -- where the culture hasn’t quite moved as dogmatically in that direction so.

**MR. GOOD:** Just want –

**MS. NGUYEN:** Also -- sorry. I’m also wondering whether you could use the question of abortion as an indicator for this changing cultural priorities of young millennials. Not just in terms of like what is the -- like what kind of cultural priorities that I guess you could identify with like social justice, women’s rights, women’s abortion. Like does that -- that could also indicate a, you know -- it’s like a proxy for what millennial evangelicals consider important in terms of like their drive to Republican -- back to the Republican Party.

**MR. WEHNER:** I just want to make two points on Will’s question. On the issue of gay marriage I actually think the seminal event was Andrew Sullivan and Jon Rauch making their arguments. And what they argued -- what it did is it shifted in the minds of evangelical Christians and a lot of other people. The gay rights movement went from a transgressive movement to actually a conservative movement because their argument was we’re not trying to destroy the institution of marriage. We actually treasure it and want to be a part of it. So that in the mind of a lot of people went from being a movement that was a threat to a kind of human movement in which people said we want to be a part of that. So I think that what Andrew and Jon did in their -- in the case they made -- really Andrew first in the early 90s, maybe even the late 80s. So that’s the first. The other one, Will, as I think in my own conversations with people is the way a lot of evangelical Christians understand the issue of right to life is that you’re expanding the circle of protection to the most vulnerable of the human community. Whether one agrees with it or not that’s how evangelicals see it. Whereas the issue of same sex marriage is constricting a right in saying we’re gonna -- we’re gonna stop it and that’s just a very different thing. So that’s why I think abortion attitudes among evangelicals has remained fairly steady whereas the ones on same sex marriage changed and I suspect will continue to.

**FEMALE SPEAKER:** I suspect it’s also maybe just as simple as attitudes about whether being gay’s a choice or not have changed. I think that’s changed hugely especially for younger evangelicals. And abortion obviously is still (inaudible) on both sides as something you could do or not do. And that’s -- that’s not a way gay marriage -- gay
rights are seen.

**QUESTION 5**

**FEMALE SPEAKER:** I think what you said was right, Alan, for you for data wise how much contraception plays into the abortion questions. Whether how feelings regarding contraception versus abortion have changed over the past few years and I wonder if that would be more similar trend toward feelings on same sex marriage. I don’t know if you’ve seen any of that.

**MR. COOPERMAN:** Yeah. And I’d have to go back and look. I -- you know, to be honest, I don’t think we’ve asked contraception questions on a regular basis in recent years. Even among American Catholics, opposition to the use of contraception is low. And as best I recall, those numbers are -- in previous data were -- not moving, but I could go back and look. And maybe we should ask it again.

**MR. GOOD:** So –

**FEMALE SPEAKER:** (Inaudible.)

**MR. COOPERMAN:** My guess is that there’s not a lot of change in attitudes toward contraception. They’re not -- they’re not hardening, they’re not softening, but opposition is much lower than opposition to abortion.

**MR. GOOD:** I think with that I’ll suggest that we take a ten-minute break and come back for what’s likely to be a generative conversation starting off with Tom Hallman.

**Q&A 2**

**QUESTION 1**

**MR. GOOD:** And, Tom Hallman, welcome back.

**MR. HALLMAN:** Thank you. I’m not a political or religious reporter. I’m a storyteller. So my question is gonna be kind of broad and philosophical. In all the stories I’ve ever covered matters of faith and belief or non-belief are always below the surface, but rarely discussed unless we ask these provocative questions and really listen. So my question is it possible to stop covering religion as something strictly political and with data and percentages and what role do people in this room -- reporters, columnists, editors, commentators -- need to do to change -- this conference the title is faith. And I’m wondering is it possible to cover faith as part of the fabric of our life with all
its complexities and mess and in doing so what might we find more common ground between these various groups.

**MR. GOOD:** That’s a wonderful question. And just to say a brief word on behalf of the project I think we’ll be able to draw some more of that textured faith under the fabric of the surface of things dynamic at work and conversation about poverty and the conversation tomorrow about the Catholic Church and then a lot of others. It is a great question. This one of the heels of the election, you know, sort of –

**MALE SPEAKER:** Right.

**MR. GOOD:** -- backing in. But I think it’s a great word that we will distill and draw out increasingly over time through a whole variety of forum including some things. We’re doing pod casts in the future as well. But it’s a great reminder about the fitness of what -- that we’re here and appreciate it. Unless Henry or Alan wants to comment on that it’s a sort of nudge for us all to be thinking about that piece. I think I’ve got Wajahat’s on next. Let’s go to Joe first please.

**QUESTION 2**

**MR. PODHORETZ:** Okay. The elections, this revenge of the RINOS that you so amusingly laid out before the election and that came entirely to fruition in the election I think the personal feelings about Trump need to be attached as well to a set of questions that relate to faith, but are meaningful to people who aren’t particularly driven by faith or for whom religion is not central in their lives. And that is these -- the moral questions that attach to Trump’s presidency. And some moral questions that he’s uniquely ill-disposed to deal with that maybe a more conventional politician in our time would. I was driven to this thought by this very good piece that Tim Alberta has in Politico -- published in Politico yesterday about the decline of pornography as a political issue in the United States over the last 40- some-odd years and how it was kind of central to a lot of the Republican conservative critique of American modernity let’s say or the life that Americans were leading for many years and then it seemed to melt away. And I’m struck now as the parent of teenagers by the mere panic that mo- -- a lot of us feel and that many Americans feel about the fact that pornography is now not only not -- it’s not a -- so there are not porn shops and there are no porn theaters and the urban streetscape and the suburban have been cleaned up, but
that it’s coming into everybody’s phone. And this is — you know, there are multiple meetings at schools and, you
know, panic about what this will mean in terms of adolescent sexuality going forward and whether kids will be
disposed to have intimate relations in a proper context and feel what we think we should feel in that way. And
that we — and then I think, again, a more conventional presidency given the heat with which this issue is felt I
think across the board demographically, culturally, economically. But, of course, this is something to which Trump
is uniquely ill-disposed or ill-suited to make — make the case. And I wonder therefore whether in this question of
dealing with the moral failings of Trump whether some of these issues could be taken up by a Democratic
candidate who still has to be, you know, mindful. Is this somewhere where this question of whether or not the
suburban RINOS faced with a stark choice between Trump and not Trump in 2020, but like a very left-wing
Democrat who wants to raise taxes and all of that whether they will snap back regretfully because they can —
they’re terrified of putting the presidency in the hands of a very left-wing person. But whether some of that could
be mitigated by some focus on social issues that aren’t the hot button -- the old hot button issues because there
seem to be new social issues including the loneliness ques- -- the question of these isolated young men doing --
you know, committing mass shootings and all that all of which would fall under the rubric I think of social issues
that don’t have a party.

MR. OLSEN: If I were a Democrat -- if I were advising a Democratic candidate I would definitely ask them to take
that up because I think -- I think since the Clinton impeachment this country has -- there’s been a center that has
wanted national healing. You’re finding more commonality rather than division. Bush promised to do that and he
didn’t. Obama promised to do it and he didn’t. Trump is anything but that. And I think it would be really smart for
the Democrats to finally nominate somebody who not only promises, but delivers on that and that would include
things like talking about moral concerns that unite rather than divide. I think the biggest reason people dislike
Trump is they fundamentally think he’s an immoral person. And whether it’s racism or sexism or vulgarity --
vulgarity it’s a moral concern that’s driving them, not a ra- -- not calculative concern. And for a Democrat to be
able to tap into that in some way would be very, very wise. Whether the eventual nominee sees things that way

or not is another question. And they also have to come across as, you know, sincere. You know, we shouldn’t forget that when a Democrat could do that like was Bill Clinton dealing with these concerns in the 90s talking -- Tipper Gore talking about awful rap lyrics and putting the V-chip in television that parents forget they have. But, you know, you can block your kids –

MALE SPEAKER: Yeah.

MR. OLSEN: -- from watching that stuff. You know, suggesting that there should be some sort of a V-chip in telephones that would -- parents could take the phone and block certain things would be very smart thing for a Democrat to do. And that Trump because of who he is, as you say, I think uniquely incapable of either addressing the issue or being credible on it.

QUESTION 3
MR. ALI: All right. So I’m gonna invoke the Will rule of asking multiple questions, but pretending I just asked one. Thank you all for setting the precedent. And thank you, Henry and Alan, for all the data. So we’ve already talked about gay marriage and abortion and now porn. Thank you, Joe. And it’s not even lunch. I’ll be the guy who brings up the caravan that was -- that was supposed to take over Texas and convert everyone to Islam. But in particular -- and this goes to Henry, you know, your classification of these power animals, right, the RINOS and the TIGERS. I’m really curious especially with witnessing how Trump doubled down on the caravan, right, in such a robust economy he decided to go for that. And you’re saying, you know, he’s courting these -- the Electoral College, not the popular vote, the rust belt, the rural parts of American. How much has racial anxiety motivated the TIGERS? And if my -- if my understanding was correct, those are the former Democrats who are the blue collar –

MR. OLSEN: Right.

MR. ALI: -- voters now in the rural America that are now going for Republicans.

MR. OLSEN: Yeah.

MR. ALI: So that’s question number one. And number two, I’m just really -- you know, I’ve been following like everyone else the evangelical vote. 83 percent of the white evangelical voters solidly with Trump. I guess the first question I had was, you know, what will it take to abandon Trump? But then I saw the data which Alan showed
that now it’s 73 percent, right. So from 83 to 73. I don’t know if that’s statistically big enough. That’s 10 percent in a year and a half. So the question I think I -- I’m interested in is what caused that 10 percent to leave him? Those are the two questions.

MR. OLSEN: So, yeah, on the -- there is competing data. You know, I often wonder about the study that says racism drives Trump voters. You know, is that -- you can often dig up what you bury to begin with. I think that what drove -- there are different things I think that drove Trump voters. You know, there are -- there’s some data that, you know, suggests that racial animus drove some of them. I think there’s also data that suggests that there’s a generalized fear of what the future brings for them that they tended to experience the downsides of modernity the last 15 or 20 years and that they can be impacted with demographic change. You know, so it’s not necessarily race, but it’s part of where -- where am I going to stand. There’s data that Pew put out from -- that show that religious identity is tied to -- not just in the United States, but across Western Europe as well to belief that Muslim immigration is harmful to society. So we often look at it through our own lens, but, you know, generally the Pew data in Western Europe show that if you even don’t attend church but if you still identify as a Christian you’re more likely to see Muslim immigration as problematic or dif- -- or challenging for your culture than if you’re purely secular. Which suggests there’s -- one of the things that with Trump’s rise I thought was very noted and I still think -- although I keep eating away on it -- is that Trump, you know -- Trump goes from being the leader to the presumptive nominee when he endorses the Muslin ban. That he -- if you look at data he starts the campaign, as you’d say in the polling business, upside down with Republicans. Like 30 something approve, 60 percent disapprove. Summer talks about immigration and trade, flips those numbers by the end of summer so it’s 58 or 60 approve and he’s getting about 25 percent of the national vote. And that pretty much stays through until Paris and San Bernardino. He comes out with the Muslim ban. His favorability’s do not jump up, but his poll ratings go up from 25 to 35. That there was something about the fear of Islamic terrorism that he embraced in a way that even in a field of people who were less than soft on Islamic terrorism stood out. So I think there’s many factors that we should -- that we should take a look at. And I think it’s -- if you wanted to characterize -- I often think that
Trump overestimates the degree to which racial resentment or racial animosity drives his voters. And that’s actually an error on his part, you know. Like doubling down on all the tweets against people of color taking the knee like in the 2017 season during the Alabama Senate race. I’m sure he’s thinking, oh, those dumb crackers, they’re just gonna, you know, fall -- and, in fact, his candidate loses because that’s not what was driving them, you know, that degree of animosity. It was something else in the culture that’s tied up with their economic state I think that drove them. So it’s complex and I think it’s easy to overstate.

MALE SPEAKER: Does it still work with the TIGERS, though?

MR. OLSEN: Well, that’s what I’m talking about is I think that’s true of the TIGERS. I don’t think that -- you know, there’s data that suggests that they are likelier to answer favorably to questions that social scientists say measure racial resentment, but I’ve had people say that if you took out the words Hispanic or black and you put in another group that people answer those questions similarly. So they don’t measure racial animosity because you rarely ask those questions. But I think Trump tends to think they do and I think that’s -- that’s an error. You know, in Michigan the candidate running is black and it didn’t stop all these TIGERS from jumping over and voting for a black man against a white woman for Senator. So I think it’s over- -- it’s present, but it’s -- it’s vastly overstated.

MR. WEHNER: Can I just interject –

MR. GOOD: Please.

MR. WEHNER: -- (inaudible).

MR. GOOD: Pete, just hit your button, please.

MR. WEHNER: Sorry. There was a fascinating study by Diana Mutz, it’s M-U-T-Z, from the University of Pennsylvania earlier this year where she compared Obama supporters and Trump supporters. And basically the finding of her study was that the earlier narrative of the 2016 election which was driven primarily by economic anxiety wasn’t correct or her findings were that Trump voters -- mostly white, male, and Christian -- were driven by cultural anxiety, by fear of losing their status in society, and by longing to regain their sense of social dominance. So it was a -- it was a feeling that the dominance in the country was over. And one of her findings
that was interesting, quite striking to me, is that Trump supporters felt that groups like whites, Christians, and men faced more discrimination than minorities, Muslims, or women. So I think that goes to some ex- -- that bears on the question of what was driving this the sense of anxiety.

**MR. GOOD:** Appreciate that. Kathy Edin will get in as well on this.

**MS. EDIN:** Thank you. Ah, there we go. You know, so I’m an ethnographer and hang out in people’s houses and talk with them and I’ve been -- my research partners and I have been doing a lot of work with middle educated men, high school diploma, no college. It seems to me that, you know, it’s not that they’re in- -- their neighborhoods are becoming more integrated. Racial integration by neighborhood is hardly moved. And, in fact, the economic segregation is increasing by neighborhood so that’s not what’s going. You know, what I’m wondering about is what -- what people face day to day. And I suspect the answer is gender. And, you know, we have this one question we ask over and over again about views towards same sex marriage, but within the family men are having to rethink maybe how the interpreted incidences with women generations ago. There may be a finding that their wives are earning a bigger share of the pie, their daughters are maybe less likely to go along. The rate of marriage is declining, the rate of non-marital childbearing is increasing. You know, anecdotally the work of Tay Meadows (phonetic) partly bears this out, but I don’t think we know a lot about this. The number of folks with children who -- who are gay, lesbian, who are transitioning it’s everywhere. So I’m wondering whether we’re asking enough about gender and whether we need to move beyond these simple measures of gender change to really flesh out the story here.

**MR. PODHORETZ:** Can I just add --

**MALE SPEAKER:** (Inaudible.)

**MR. PODHORETZ:** -- to Pete’s -- just to Pete’s summary that, you know, one of the most interesting anecdotal things that one hears about the TIGERS, let’s say, or people like the TIGERS is this idea, for example, that blacks and Hispanics get more benefits from the government than whites do which is, of course, preposterous because these benefits are not tested by -- by race or ethnicity. And, in fact, whites I think in aggregate take -- get far more
in the way of welfare, you know, than -- than African Americans or Hispanics. But I think this is a conviction, this is a false belief that is nonetheless extremely widespread. And why it’s widespread is a different issue and it’s -- whether or not there’s this clichéd understanding of what happened -- what life is like for African Americans and Hispanics as opposed to poor whites who now I think increasingly share the same social pathologies according to all the data that we see. But, I mean, I think that’s a -- because I’m not sure then under those circumstances you can say that that is racist animus in the sense that they believe something that is not true and are therefore resentful of it despite its falsity. So they are operating out of not false consciousness, but false reality and therefore it’s not just hostility that is driving them it’s an incorrect understanding of how things work.

**MR. GOOD:** That’s great. Next on our list is Amy Sullivan whose show deals with some of these things I know as well. If you want to respond to that, Amy, please.

**QUESTION 4**

**MS. SULLIVAN:** It’s called Impolite Company. It’s a podcast about religion and politics in impolite company. Alan, as usual the data here is really fascinating. I felt like many of your myths were a personal attack on my theories –

**MR. COOPERMAN:** No. No, no, no.

**MS. SULLIVAN:** -- about evangelicals and where they’re going.

**MR. COOPERMAN:** No.

**MS. SULLIVAN:** But you left one out so I wanted to see –

**MR. COOPERMAN:** Yes?

**MS. SULLIVAN:** -- if maybe there’s one still remaining. Have you been able to pick up any noticeable differences in gender among white evangelicals? And secondly, will there be another religious switchers report coming from Pew in the near future because I wonder how much is being not captured right now of movement into the none category and out.

**MR. COOPERMAN:** Yes. The gender gap ... in politics does cut across, I think, all the major religious groups. But I will have to dig up the numbers, and I don’t have them in front of me. But I suspect that the gender gap among white evangelicals may be smaller than it is in the general public in terms of party ID. But I’ll have to -- I’ll look at
MS. SULLIVAN: I think Trump approval in a PRRI poll over the summer was -- there was a significant difference, about 20 points.

MR. COOPERMAN: I’m sure there are gender gaps within evangelicals, because I think that the gender gaps, which are overall very large, cut across all the major religious groups. It may be that the gender gaps are somewhat smaller among white evangelicals than in some of the other groups, but I’m sure that they’re there. I think that the point about gender is really well taken. Gender is huge in terms of its impact on social displacement, in terms of sort of the unspoken ways, perhaps, in which gender norms have changed in our society and left people feeling unmoored. Less educated white men for example, but I don’t think restricted to them. And I think the Kavanaugh hearings brought a lot of that to the fore and may have played a subtle role in these elections. We have asked lots of questions about gender attitudes. Some of the best questions that we try to ask are what we call balanced choice questions. They’re questions in which we give people, sort of, would you say it’s more this or more that? It’s sort of some truth on both sides. We try to make them a little bit tough questions for people to answer, and then we see -- it’s not just where the whole public comes down, but where they differ. And I don’t have the gender one. We’ve asked this -- about gender and race we’ve asked this question, that goes something along the lines of: Do you think that our society has done enough to address, to take care of inequality in race, or does more still need to be done? And a similar question, not exactly worded the same, but similar: Have women basically achieved equality in our society, or is there still a lot of structural discrimination against women in our society? And these questions show big gaps between Republicans and Democrats, and particularly between self-identified conservatives and self-identified liberals. Those questions are huge. I do have a few of these in front of me. Just to give an example, Wajahat asked about immigration. On a question like: Would you say that immigrants today strengthen our country because of their hard work and talents, or are a burden on our country because they take our jobs, housing, and healthcare? And, you know, the public as a whole is pretty divided on this, as on a lot of these balanced choice questions, but the partisan splits are huge. So 69 percent of Republicans say
immigrants do more harm than good. Sorry. Wait a minute. That’s the wrong one. Sorry. 44 percent of all Republicans say immigrants are a burden on our country because they take our jobs, housing, and healthcare, and 42 percent say they strengthen our country. Among Democrats, 84 percent say they strengthen our country. So there’s a 40-point difference between Republicans and Democrats on that question. There is a slightly different wording of the question but having to do with –

**MALE SPEAKER:** Is that on immigration?

**MR. COOPERMAN:** Yeah. That’s from the summer of 2017. Take the border wall. The more recent question, in January 2018, was: Do you favor expanding the wall along the U.S. border with Mexico? 85 percent of Democrats opposed, 72 percent of Republicans in favor.

**MALE SPEAKER:** Uh-huh.

**MR. COOPERMAN:** These are, they’re huge differences. But, as you know, even questions like global warming have become hugely politically polarized. All these questions have become polarized. And one of the most revealing to me is this question: Would you prefer to live in a place where the homes are bigger, but they’re further away from work and amenities like schools and shopping? Or would you prefer to live in a place where the homes are smaller but they’re closer to work and to amenities like schools and shopping? And the public as a whole is split, almost evenly, on this as I recall. But Democrats overwhelmingly want to live in smaller houses but closer to things, and Republicans overwhelmingly want to live in bigger houses and farther away from things. And what that speaks to is, to get to whoever it was who talked about neighborhoods and whether neighborhoods are changing? I don’t even know that the neighborhoods are changing, but people’s desire for where they live is very different. And so that question isn’t [asking] where you live, it’s where you’d like to live.

**FEMALE SPEAKER:** (Inaudible.)

**MR. COOPERMAN:** Yes. We’ve asked that question, and the [partisan] polarization on that question is huge. We’ve asked a whole set of forced-choice questions. We’ve asked them many -- some of them we’ve asked for many years. And what we can see, in our sort of “moving mountains” graphics, is that polarization is taking place,
and more and more Democrats are on one side, and more and more Republicans are on the other, and there are fewer and fewer people who are in the middle.

**MALE SPEAKER:** (Inaudible.)

**MR. COOPERMAN:** Yeah. So the interesting thing I think about independents is that the share of Americans who identify as politically independent has been rising, but most of them, in fact, if you ask, lean one way or the other. And the ones who lean are actually, in their views, quite conservative or somewhat liberal. So independents who lean Republican, on various measures of their stance are, in fact, often more reliably conservative in their views than people who just plain identify as Republican.

**MALE SPEAKER:** (Inaudible.)

**MR. COOPERMAN:** What I’m trying to say is, simply the label “independent” does not mean that somebody’s a swing voter and sort of moderate or in the middle. And ... I can take the “Republicans” and “Democrats” out of the labels and just show you where people are on these issues, and show you the polarization. The country is polarizing on these issues.

**QUESTION 5**

**MR. GOOD:** Just by way of a reminder, we’ve got Bob Smietana, we’ve got Carl Cannon, Tina, and Tara next. So, Bob, you’re up.

**MR. SMIETANA:** I won’t ask all 15, but I do have a couple questions. So one is I have a question about the myth question and whether the myth question looks different if you look at born again evangelical, but not by race. Because if you look at -- like you look at your religious landscape the -- the -- those groups look different ec- -- older evangelicals, born agains look different than millennials. Racially -- especially race. So I wonder if it’d be different if you could look at that -- that issue if there is a difference between younger, but not -- if you take out white. The second would be it would be great to -- I think that Tom’s question about the religious right/religious left is really a -- least in the majority groups is really a what do white Christians think and what do non-white Christians think. Because we focus a lot on white evangelicals support for Trump, but white Catholics, white mainliners also supported Trump pretty strongly and nobody -- there’s very little talking about that. But those --
I think if you look at all the Republican Party looks like the white Christian party. So I guess and the third question would be my big picture view of the country is that we live in different moral universes. So I live in Nashville and I used to live in Chicago and they are different universes like the expectations. So we have all this polarization data. It would be wonderful if someone who’s smarter than me could put together of like the -- could quantify all the things. Because we look at -- we look at religion and we say, oh, that one data point is our narrative. But it’s really we have religious -- religious, cultural, economic, technological change all happening at the same time and people have different views. So we have people who want to live in small houses and big houses, people who think that Christianity or religion has a different point of view in the country, people think about different -- I wonder if there’s a way to -- if all those factors coalesce in some ways in different universes or different groupings of people. So -- so three questions.

**MR. COOPERMAN:** Let me tackle the first one. But first, kind of a somewhat philosophical thing about it: For sure, when we’re talking about religion and all the standard measures of religiosity -- religious beliefs, religious practices -- if you look at white evangelicals and you look at non-white evangelicals, they’re very close [on those questions]. So, if we’re talking [purely] about religion, I wouldn’t see any reason to separate out people by race. And, in fact, when we do our religious landscape study and we look at evangelicals, the evangelical tradition, it’s not divided by race. But when you look at politics, the politics of white evangelicals and the politics of non-white evangelicals are so different –

**MR. SMIETANA:** Uh-huh.

**MR. COOPERMAN:** -- that putting them together is just muddying the waters. You could actually make the same argument about Catholics and why, when it comes to politics, you really should separate out white Catholics from Hispanic Catholics. And I would do that, and I would have done it [today] if I could have, but we didn’t have the exit poll data for that. Now to get to the specifics of your question, I’m sorry to do this to you, if you want to turn back to slide number 15. And here, broken out by generation, within religious groups are the differences by generation in terms of party ID. And you see -- among white evangelicals -- that the millennials are not more
liberal than the older generations.

MR. SMIETANA: Uh-huh.

MR. COOPERMAN: I mean, you know, again, you can look at these numbers and you may see a difference between 80 [percent] and 77. I would say that difference is not statistically –

MR. SMIETANA: No.

MR. COOPERMAN: -- significant when we’re, among the Baby Boomers, at 76 percent and among the Silent [Generation] at 77. So I don’t see any difference by –

MR. SMIETANA: So I guess my –

MR. COOPERMAN: Now –

MR. SMIETANA: Yeah. Go ahead. I’m sorry.

MR. COOPERMAN: So now look down at the black Protestants.

MR. SMIETANA: Yes.

MR. COOPERMAN: So if you were going to take white evangelicals and say, let’s not just look at white evangelicals, let’s look at ALL evangelicals, the people that you’d mostly be pulling in would be from that black Protestant category. And I don’t see any difference. If anything, the black millennials are maybe a little more Republican-leaning than the older ones. So now, of course, Hispanics are -- if we look at Hispanic Catholics, they may or may not give you a clue as to Hispanic evangelicals. But Hispanic Catholics, I don’t see any difference. So I’m going to guess. I haven’t run the numbers, but I don’t see any reason to think that if we did conflate these categories and put them all back in and took race out of the equation and just looked at all the people who self-identify as born-again evangelicals, by generation, I don’t think we’re going to find that the younger generation is more liberal.

MR. SMIETANA: But if -- so my question would be if the younger generation of -- if that group is more ethnically diverse, significantly more ethnically diverse between older and younger and the younger ethnically -- people of color have different political views they would look different. Maybe I’m wrong.
MR. COOPERMAN: Oh, for sure.

MR. SMIETANA: Yeah.

MR. COOPERMAN: Oh, you mean if you took all evangelicals –

MR. SMIETANA: Yes. Yes.

MR. COOPERMAN: -- and include -- included –

MR. SMIETANA: That’s my question, yes.

MR. COOPERMAN: -- race –

MR. SMIETANA: I’m sorry.

MR. COOPERMAN: -- oh, of course then the -- yeah, yeah, yeah. But that’s because -- again, that’s why putting them together just muddies the picture.

MR. SMIETANA: But I think it makes it clearer because you -- you’ve making a social construct saying, well, white evangelicals vote this and then you say white evangelical -- I mean, I’m not arguing for you. In our general -- the problem in our discussions of these is we’re not clear on terms. So we -- we use the word evangelicals to mean white evangelical in politics, but not in religion.

MR. COOPERMAN: Right.

MR. SMIETANA: But then we’re talking about religious groups, you’re talking about that religious movement it’s -- it’s politically divided -- much more politically divided and getting –

MR. COOPERMAN: Okay.

MR. SMIETANA: So I can say that it’s –

MR. COOPERMAN: I hear your point. I would just say I think it makes sense –

MR. SMIETANA: Oh, no. No. I –

MR. COOPERMAN: -- to talk about them separately in politics and not in religion.

MR. SMIETANA: But I think the myth is true, but not -- it doesn’t make sense to talk about it. Maybe I’m wrong.

MR. COOPERMAN: (Inaudible) question two about the 10 percent you think were lost. I’m not sure that 10
percent were lost. I think the 82 percent figure, 81 percent figure was very widely reported as the proportion of white evangelical Protestants. Not all evangelicals.

MR. SMIETANA: Yes.

MR. COOPERMAN: Just white evangelical Protestants who voted for Trump in the 2016 election. So we don’t have a 2020 election yet so I don’t know what it will be, but if we were to look back at presidential elections apples to apples it’s very similar to the share of white evangelical Protestants who voted for McCain and who voted for Bush and who voted for Romney. It is -- it’s all been right in that range of 7 and three quarters to 8 out of 10 white evangelical Protestants have voted for the Republican nominee in recent presidential elections whether that nominee is a Mormon, a John McCain type not especially religious sort of person, a Trump, whatever. It’s -- it’s sort of baked in the cake. Now if you look at midterms -- because, again, I think it’s not really right to compare presidential to midterm. If you look at midterms you just go back to my very first chart on page 4 and you’ll see that the share of white evangelicals who voted for Republicans in the House vote, the Congressional ballot (inaudible), is the same as what it was in 2010 and 2014 so I don’t think that they moved. There is this other chart pre-election, you know, of -- of party ID and you might -- might see -- or this is what we’ve argued back and forth of for presidential approval in party ID -- or actually not in party ID, but in presidential approval you might see some slippage. We agreed to disagree on that because I see more stability than slippage, but -- but in terms of actual voting I don’t see anything -- no 10 percent of loss.

QUESTION 6
MR. GOOD: It’s good in some ways. It reminds us of Tom’s deep point about the thickness of faith under the waterline that’s manifest dynamic. (Inaudible) on this and then we’ll go to Carl. (Inaudible) really quick?

FEMALE SPEAKER: (Inaudible.)

MR. COOPERMAN: Can you use the microphone?

FEMALE SPEAKER: Yeah, sorry. Alan, do you -- have you been looking at Southern Baptists in this context as a denomination in particular?

MR. COOPERMAN: Yeah. When we have a survey with big enough numbers and where we ask people those sorts
of specific questions. So –

FEMALE SPEAKER: Uh-huh.

MR. COOPERMAN: -- we wouldn't have that for exit polls. They don't ask about denomination.

FEMALE SPEAKER: Uh-huh.

MR. COOPERMAN: And we wouldn't have it for most of our regular polls. We’d have to either aggregated telephone polls, look at a really large poll like the [2014] Religious Landscape Survey –

FEMALE SPEAKER: Uh-huh.

MR. COOPERMAN: -- or if we’re working with panel data, which we work with a lot, we have that data on the panelists. So, yes, we can say something about Southern Baptists. What’s your question about them?

FEMALE SPEAKER: Well, just, I mean, in this, you know, context I’ve seen data -- this must be yours because I would think that Pew would have this. That, you know, of Trump supporters -- or white evangelicals support Trump but, say, 74 percent, among Southern Baptists it’s 84 percent. And to me sort of all the things we’re talking about with white evangelicals are really traits of Southern Baptists the convention. I mean, there’s sort of -- you’d think (inaudible) saturated version of this, right? Thank you, Kathy.

MR. COOPERMAN: Yeah. So Southern Baptists are, of course, the largest single denomination in the evangelical camp. Now we’re not -- now I’m not dividing out by race –

FEMALE SPEAKER: Right. Right.

MR. COOPERMAN: -- but among evangelical –

FEMALE SPEAKER: Well, they’re mostly -- mostly Anglo.

MR. COOPERMAN: But they [Southern Baptists] are still not a majority [of evangelicals]. So I don’t know what to say. I don’t think Southern Baptists are going to look a whole lot different from evangelicals as a whole on most religious issues. You’ve got a few things where you’ve got some people who are both evangelical and Pentecostal and, you know, might speak in tongues, that sort of thing, religiously, and the Southern Baptist Convention is not down with that.
FEMALE SPEAKER: Uh-huh.

MR. COOPERMAN: So I think that in terms of religion you could, possibly, find some differences between Southern Baptists and evangelicals as a whole.

FEMALE SPEAKER: Uh-huh.

MR. COOPERMAN: And the political data you’re citing, I’m not familiar with it. It’s entirely possible that Southern Baptists could be a little bit higher [on measures of support for Trump] than evangelicals as a whole, but, you know, they’re also stronger in the South. The difference might partly reflect the regional concentration of Southern Baptists.

FEMALE SPEAKER: Uh-huh.

QUESTION 7

MR. GOOD: That’s good. We’ve got about five minutes to go. Carl Cannon, you’re up, please.

MR. CANNON: I have a question for you, Henry.

MR. OLSEN: Sure.

MR. CANNON: On that slide on page 11 that John Podhoretz and I were both interested in -- and I appreciate -- Alan, I appreciate you explaining why that’s not sea change, but it’s a slight change.

MR. COOPERMAN: Slide 11?

MR. CANNON: Uh-huh. It’s --

MR. COOPERMAN: The white evangelical Protestants?

MR. CANNON: -- actually page 11, but, yeah. So -- so if that -- a lot of these districts -- a lot of these places you talked about, Henry, these suburbs they have -- they may be in the suburbs in wealthy, successful cities but they -- the biggest megachurches in the country -- evangelical churches are also in these places. In Houston, you know, which went -- that pivotal district you talked about they have the New Light Church and where we live in Northern Virginia there’s McLean Bible Church and the Falls Church and Orange County where the Republicans lost we’re not sure how many seats but --

MR. OLSEN: Right.
MR. CANNON: -- they’re losing Saddleback’s there in Laguna Hills. And a lot of these people you call them RINOS.

MR. OLSEN: Well, I’m trying to be cute.

MR. CANNON: I know. I know. But I’m saying -- but what I’m asking you about, though, is -- is who -- I’m trying to hone in on who these people are. So they’re Republican voters mostly. They’re evangelical Christians the people who go to this church, but they’re in these suburbs. And I’m wondering if a -- there’s a suburban identity merging that’s also sort of a third way that they think of themselves.

MR. OLSEN: I -- you know, I would love to see data that would look at subgroups within the suburban community. I mean, one thing a lot of these suburban communities they may have high profile megachurches in them, but as a percentage of the population self-declared white evangelical Protestants are significantly lower than in other places. So like McLean has the McLean Bible Church and it draws from all across, but I can assure you that the percentage of self-described white evangelical Protestants in Barbara Comstock’s district is significantly lower than in other places. So you do -- you’d have to take a look at that. I commissioned a piece on Orange County for a British website that I’m an editor for. And the woman who wrote that she’s an evangelical who is one of these people who thinks Trump is awful. You know, voted straight Republican all of her life and is now like in this quandary. And I think she said that there were 350,000 evangelical Protestants in Orange County. Well, there are 3 million people in Orange County.

MR. CANNON: All right.

MR. OLSEN: That’s 10 percent. So you’d have these high profile churches, but -- and they draw tens of thousands of people, but they may be the ones who are staying loyal while it’s the other who are not. But we don’t have that sort of granular data for me to answer that other than by conjecture.

MR. CANNON: Well, that -- well, that -- okay. So we -- my question is we don’t really -- you don’t really know the answer. But I -- I --

MR. OLSEN: I know the answer, you know --

MR. CANNON: But, wait. In these places you’re talking about Orange Count is it possible that the evangelical
Christians -- this decline even if it’s small that was the margin of victory in some of these cases?

**MR. OLSEN:** Well, we don’t know yet. I mean, obviously in places like Oklahoma City or Charleston where the -- where we know that, you know, Oklahoma City’s gonna have a higher percentage of white evangelical Protestants in its suburban area than Orange County, you know, a slight decline would matter. But we don’t have the data that allow us to say that and I don’t know if we will because we’re talking about granular level areas where to get those sort of data you would have to have very larger than normal polls to capture that. You know, like if I wanted to get -- if I did a 400 -- a 400-person survey in -- in typical a Congressional district which is typically about 4 or 500 people, you know, I might have 150 or 200 white evangelical Protestants and the margin of error on an (inaudible) of that size is really large. So I couldn’t say with any degree of certainty that if -- you know, if I had that prime series and said, well, you know, in Oklahoma City -- Oklahoma 5 it was -- used to be 75 percent Republican among evangelicals and now it’s 70. The margin of error in that (inaudible) is larger than the share. So I’m -- Alan can jump in since I’m not a pollster. I play one on TV. But I think that’s –

**MALE SPEAKER:** Henry, you’re being –

**MR. OLSEN:** You’d have to get a data size –

**MALE SPEAKER:** I’m –

**MR. OLSEN:** -- or you’d have to get a sample size large enough that no one’s gonna do for us to be able to do more than (inaudible).

**MALE SPEAKER:** Well, I’m really trying to help Mike Gurst (phonetic) and Peter Wehner feel better and you are not helping me.

**MR. COOPERMAN:** Well, let me jump in and say, Carl, of course it’s possible. The thing is, when a race is tight, as with our recent presidential elections nationally, and even more when you’re looking at either presidential or Congressional races down to very particular districts and they’re swung by, you know, as we’re seeing, less than 1 percent of the vote -- well, what made that difference? If you have the granular data, you can argue it was all different kinds of things.
MR. OLSEN: Right.

MR. COOPERMAN: I mean, because any of a number of shifts would explain that.

MR. OLSEN: And that’s true with any election it’s always multiple things coming together that aggregate into a whole.

MR. COOPERMAN: Right. But one thing that I’m surprised we haven’t had more questions about is -- and maybe it’s partly because I explained that we don’t have good data on it yet – age. Turnout levels among young adults may have been a big factor in the midterm elections.

FEMALE SPEAKER: Yeah.

MR. COOPERMAN: -- Also, gender. Gender’s big, and education’s big, too. But age is a [particularly] big gap [in vote choice] in these elections, and younger Americans do tend to be more [religiously] unaffiliated. And we see a substantial rise in the share of unaffiliated voters in this election. So, if you’re looking for things to say, well, this could have been the difference -- and lots of things could have been the difference -- I would say you’re seeing potentially now the unaffiliated -- the “nones” -- having some impact. Again, if we really knew, if we really had the granular data in this election, [we could tell whether unaffiliated young voters turned out at high rates] when we haven’t seen that in the past.

MR. OLSEN: And one thing I would say is that I guess on the few counties that I -- I was talking with Alan about this last night is if you look at a college dominated or college -- significant college impact county, you know, you find that in -- you know, Indiana or in Montana they swung for the Democrats this time. And I haven’t looked at turnout as well, but at least in that instance, you know, you can take a look and say we can draw an inference that col- -- young people going to a four-year institution increased their Democratic propensity and that might be because of people switching or because of higher turnout. Beyond that I don’t think we have -- that’s an inference. Not real data. And it’ll take a long time to get those data.